ABSTRACT December 31, 2004, and December 31, 2005, 
On September 26, 2006, Zix Corporation (the "Company") engaged Whitley Penn LLP ("Whitley Penn") as its independent registered public accounting firm to audit the Company's financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2006. On September 26, 2006, the Company also notified Deloitte & Touche LLP ("D&T"), its independent registered public accounting firm for the year ended December 31, 2004, and December 31, 2005, of its election to dismiss D&T as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm. The foregoing was undertaken as a cost reduction effort by the Company and has been approved by the Audit Committee of the Company's Board of Directors.
Although there could be audit fee savings in the use of non-Big 4 auditors, the quality of audit could be lower. Auditors are considered as external monitors to reduce agency costs by verifying the reliability of financial reports (Jensen and Meckling 1976) . Findings in the literature generally suggest that the services performed by Big 4/6/8 auditors are of better quality than non-Big 4/6/8 auditors in monitoring firms' reporting activities. For example, Becker et al. (1998) and Francis et al. (1999) find that firms with Big 6 auditors have less earnings management in term of lower discretionary accruals. Prior studies have also examined the effects of auditor changes on firms. Teoh and Wong (1993) show that firms switching from Big 8 auditors to non-Big 8 auditors have lower investor responses to their announced earnings after the changes. Hackenbrack and Hogan (2002) extend the analysis of Teoh and Wong and show that the decrease in investor responses to earnings announcements is partly caused by auditor changes due to fee-reductions. Overall, the findings suggest that investors consider earnings information to be less credible after the firms have switched to smaller auditors. © 2011 The Clute Institute
The research objective of this study is to examine the long-term stock and earnings performance of firms changing auditors for audit fee savings. Firms often change auditors for negative reasons such as having disagreements with auditors and receiving going-concern or ineffective internal control opinions. This study focuses on firms with auditor changes specifically for a reduction in audit fees. Audit fee savings can provide direct economic benefits to shareholders in the form of lower operating expenses. However, there are possible negative effects of auditor changes for audit fee savings. First, non-Big 4 auditors or auditors with less compensation could be less effective in monitoring firms' activities. Therefore managers in those situations are more likely to engage in activities that are not in the best interests of shareholders. Thus, agency costs could be higher and firm value would be lower. Second, the change to non-Big 4 auditors or auditors with less compensation could be a negative signal on the future prospects of firms. Since larger auditors can provide more compensation to outsider shareholders in audit failure, Bar-Yosef and Livnat (1984) develop a signaling model, which suggest that firms switched to larger auditors in order to signal expectation of higher future cash flows. Johnson and Lys (1990) also suggest that firms with more growth opportunities are more likely to have complex operations and accounting policies. Thus, the larger auditors are needed for these firms to support their future growth. The switch to non-Big 4 auditors or less compensated auditors could be negative signals that there are limiting future growth opportunities.
Specifically, we examined the stock and earnings performance of firms following their auditor change to reduce audit fees. The findings should be of interest to investors in accessing the net economic effect of auditor changes for audit fee savings. The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of related literature and research objective. The research design is described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the research findings and Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. The objective of this study is to examine the long-term stock and earnings performance of firms changing auditors specifically for audit fee savings. Firms often change auditors for multiple and/or negative reasons such as having going concern or ineffective internal control opinions. In this study, we examine a sample of firms that change auditor specifically only for audit fee savings without other cited major or apparent negative reasons. The sampling procedures are discussed in the next section. Changes in auditors could be associated with negative implications. Non-Big 4 auditors or auditors with less compensation could be less effective in monitoring management activities. This could, in turn, allow management to engage in activities that do not maximize firm value. Changes in auditors for audit fee savings could also be associated with negative signals about future prospects of firms. Prior studies find that firms with more growth opportunities and financing activities are more likely to have Big 4/6/8 auditors, in order to reduce their cost of capital since investors perceive that these auditors are of high quality in reducing agency cost (Mansi et 
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RESEARCH DESIGN
An initial sample of firms changing auditors was downloaded from the Audit Analytics database. Audit Analytics provides reasons for the auditor changes. To be included in the final sample, a firm must: (1) indicate that audit fee reduction is a reason for the auditor change; (2) not have any reportable events such as disagreement with auditor, restatement, or other negative reporting issues; (3) not have a going concern opinion; (4) not have material internal or disclosure control weaknesses; (5) not be a subsidiary or have the auditor change for its subsidiary or pension benefit plan only; (6) initiate the auditor dismissal; (7) not have Arthur Andersen as the dismissed author; (8) not be a foreign company; and (9) have the auditor change announced by the end of 2006.
The sample consists of firms that changed auditors for audit fee savings without other apparent disclosure problems. The auditor changes are also not forced changes because of regulatory problems of the dismissed auditors. To be included in the final sample, the firm must have sufficient stock and financial statement data as discussed below. Stock performance of the sample firms after their auditor changes are analyzed using the 4-factor model with pricing factors suggested by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) .
R it − R ft = α + b(R mt − R ft ) + sSMB t + hHML t + uUMD t + ε t (1) where R it = daily stock return of firm i on day t; R ft = daily return of one month Treasury Bill on day t; R mt = daily return of CRSP value-weighted index on day t; SMB t = daily return of the small-minus-big size portfolio on day t; HML t = daily return of the high-minus-low book-to-market portfolio on day t; and UMD t = daily return of the high-minus-low momentum portfolio on day t.
Stock returns are collected from CRSP. The Fama-French and momentum factors are collected from the Wharton Research Data Services. This model is estimated for each of the sample firms using 500 daily returns since the engagement date of the new auditor. The intercept (α) measures the abnormal returns of each firm in this 500-day period. We examine if the average α among the sample firms is statistically positive or negative. An average positive (negative) α suggests that the sample firms over-(under-)performed in the stock market after adjusted for their risk factors. The dependent variable is α from equation (1) above. Since there are very few cases that firms with nonBig 4 auditors change to Big-4 auditors to save audit fees, we have indicator variables for the other three more likely cases. A positive (negative) slope coefficient for BB, BN, and NN would suggest there is positive (negative) subsequent stock performance of the sample firms in those groups.
We also examined the change in return on assets in the two fiscal years ending after the change in auditor. Return on assets is defined as income before discontinued operations and extraordinary items divided by average total assets. ROA is computed for each of the two fiscal years ended before the change in auditor and for each of the two fiscal years ended after the change in auditor. Change in ROA is the ROA in the fiscal years ended after the auditor changes minus the average ROA in the two years ended before the auditor changes. Earnings and total assets are collected from Compustat and Mergent Online. Results of the analysis are presented in the following section.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The final sample consists of 51 firms. Table 1 2005) who concluded that most of the auditor changes were made by smaller firms. However, six of the sample firms have total assets of about $1 billion or more. As expected from prior studies, 27 of the firms changed their auditors from Big 4 accounting firms to non-Big 4 accounting firms in order to reduce audit fees. There in only one sample firm that changed its auditor from a non-Big 4 accounting firm to a Big 4 accounting firm. There are 9 firms that changed auditors among Big 4 accounting firms and 14 firms that changed auditors to non-Big 4 firms. Table 2 summarizes the results of the stock return analysis. The mean and median intercept of the 4-factor model for the sample firms are almost all positive. Not all of the firms have 500 daily returns available after the auditor changes. We have provided analysis for all of the sample firms as a group based on the available data as well as for firms with all 500 daily returns, at least 250 daily returns, or less than 250 daily returns. The mean intercept is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level for firms with all 500 daily returns. The median intercept is positive and significant at 1% or 5% level in three of the four groups. Overall, there is mild evidence that firms have positive risk-adjusted stock return performance after the auditor changes. = daily stock return of firm i on day t; R ft = daily return of one month Treasury Bill on day t; R mt = daily return of CRSP value-weighted index on day t; SMB t = daily return of the small-minus-big size portfolio on day t; HML t = daily return of the high-minus-low book-to-market portfolio on day t; and UMD t = daily return of the high-minus-low momentum portfolio on day t. b: two-tailed p-value for t-test of sample mean in parenthesis. c: two-tailed p-value for sign test of sample median in parenthesis. Table 3 provides the results of the return on assets analysis. The mean and median changes in ROA in the 2-year period, first year, and second year after the auditor changes are all positive. The median changes are © 2011 The Clute Institute significant in the overall 2-year period and the first year after the auditor changes at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. Overall, the return and ROA analysis indicates that there is mild evidence that firms have positive stock return and earnings performance after the auditor changes. The audit fee savings provide net economic benefits to firms. (0.3713) ROA = Income before discontinued operations and extraordinary items / ((total assets of current year + total assets of last year) / 2) Change in ROA = ROA in the period after the auditor change minus the average ROA in the two fiscal years ended before the change in auditor. ROA and change in ROA are winsorized to be within +/-1 to avoid outlier problems. a: two-tailed p-value for t-test of sample mean in parenthesis. b: two-tailed p-value for sign test of sample median in parenthesis.
We next examined if the return and ROA performance is affected by the type of auditor change. The results provided in Table 4 show that there is no significant difference in stock and ROA performance of firms among the four types of auditor changes. On possible reason for our results is that these firms changed auditors primarily to save audit fees without other regulatory and disclosure issues. Thus, different types of auditor change are not associated with different positive or negative signals. b: two-tailed p-value for sign test of sample median in parenthesis. c: R it − R ft = α + b(R mt − R ft ) + sSMB t + hHML t + uUMD t + ε t d: average annual change in ROA in the two fiscal years ending after the auditor change. e: two-tailed p-value in parenthesis.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study examined the stock return and earnings performance after firms changed auditors for audit fee savings. The findings suggest mild evidence that the stock return and earnings performance is positive after the auditor changes. This implies that there is a positive result when firms change auditors to save audit fees. Furthermore, analysis showed that the overall positive performance is common to all types of auditor changeschanging among or between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. Finally, the mild positive stock and earnings performance subsequent to auditor changes occur mainly in the period before 2004. Auditor changes since 2004 have a neutral stock and earnings performance that is not significantly different from zero. This may reflect the substantial increase in auditor services related to Section 404 compliance and the increasing importance of the monitoring role of
